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THE SUPREME COURT’S WILLINGNESS TO
LOWER PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO
MERITS REVIEW IN CASES INVOLVING
EGREGIOUS RACIAL BIAS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CARRIE LEONETTI*
The systematic foreclosure of federal-court review of even the most
meritorious federal constitutional challenges of state criminal convictions has
made review on the merits of an inmate’s claim that a state court violated the
U.S. Constitution in adjudicating a criminal case exceedingly rare.
Nonetheless, over the past two terms, the Supreme Court appears to have
started down a different road, overlooking potential procedural hurdles in
several cases to uphold on the merits state inmates’ claims that their criminal
trials were tainted by explicit race discrimination. While these cases taken
together seem to suggest that the Court is willing to address egregious and
somewhat isolated acts of racial bias in the criminal-justice system, it remains
to be seen whether this willingness will extend to more systemic and implicit
biases. The hope of this Article is that the Court will continue this line of cases
to its logical conclusion with a new jurisprudence that addresses the significant
disparate racial impacts in the criminal-justice system even when there is no
“smoking gun.”
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The last several decades have seen a largely coordinated lockstep march by
Congress and the Supreme Court to foreclose federal-court review of even
meritorious federal constitutional challenges to state criminal justice
procedures.1 For example, in Camreta v. Greene,2 a case involving an allegedly
unconstitutional seizure and interview of a nine-year-old child by child
protective services workers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the officials,
holding on the merits that the interview had been unconstitutional but found
that qualified immunity barred any recovery of damages because, at the time of
the interview, its illegality had not been clearly established.3 Despite having
won below, the officials appealed to the Supreme Court wanting the Court to
overturn the merits holding (which would establish clear precedent for the
future) in light of the procedural bar, and the Court obliged—the result being
that the constitutionality of such interviews will never be conclusively
determined in the context of a tort suit because the procedural bar of qualified

1. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 174 (2011);
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 92 (2011); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007) (holding,
pursuant to the deferential standard of review required by § 2254(d), that the Arizona state courts’
determination that Landrigan’s defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence during his
capital sentencing proceeding did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel was not an
unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s earlier cases); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66,
77 (2003) (holding, pursuant to the deferential standard of review required by § 2254(d), that the
California Court of Appeals’s decision affirming Andrade’s sentence of two consecutive terms of life
imprisonment for a “third strike” conviction of petty theft was not an unreasonable application of the
Eighth Amendment’s requirement of proportionality); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 27
(2002) (holding that the California Court of Appeals’s decision that Visciotti’s defense attorneys failure
to present or argue readily available evidence of his severe brain damage in mitigation during his
capital sentencing proceeding did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel was not an
unreasonable application of the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Woodford v. Garceau, 538
U.S. 202, 212–13 (2003).
2. 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (holding that, because it was not clearly established that the warrantless
seizure of a young child by state investigators for an interview about allegations of sexual abuse
violated the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of official immunity, the court of appeals should not
have reached the merits issue of whether the conduct was unconstitutional in the first instance), rev’g
588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
3. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3 at 1021–22, 1030, 1033. The Ninth Circuit opted to reach the
merits issue, the immunity bar notwithstanding, to provide guidance for government officials in the
future. See Camreta, 563 U.S. at 699–700.
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immunity will always operate to frustrate the merits claim.4
In Harrington v. Richter,5 Joshua Richter and a companion, Christian
Branscombe, entered the home of Joshua Johnson, a drug dealer with whom
Branscombe was acquainted, at approximately 4:00 a.m.6 A gun battle ensued,
during which Johnson was shot and injured and his houseguest, Patrick Klein,
was shot and killed.7 Johnson later told the police that he had awoken to find
Richter and Branscombe burglarizing his home, when they shot him and then
Klein, who was asleep on the living-room sofa.8 Richter had a very different
version of the night’s events. He claimed that he had been waiting outside the
residence in his truck when Branscombe went in to drop something off for
Johnson’s roommate, Tony, and then he heard shouting and gunshots.9
According to Richter, when he went inside, he found Klein lying in the doorway
to Johnson’s bedroom.10 Branscombe claimed that Johnson had shot Klein
when he awoke suddenly in the middle of the night and tried to hit him
(Branscombe) but missed.11 Both versions of events (Johnson’s and Richter
and Branscombe’s) had significant credibility issues, including that Johnson,
Klein, and Richter had all smoked marijuana together a few hours before the
shootings.12
The crime-scene investigation revealed two large pools of blood in the
home: one in Johnson’s bed and one in the doorway between Johnson’s
bedroom and the living room, where Klein had been sleeping.13 The State’s
theory was that both pools of blood were from Johnson, who had been shot in
bed but later stood in the doorway waiting for the police to arrive.14 The defense
theory was that at least some of the doorway blood was Klein’s, which refuted
Johnson’s version of events and corroborated Richter’s.15 Mid-trial, the State
asked two forensic experts to perform additional tests from the crime scene: a

4. See Camreta, 563 U.S. at 694.
5. 562 U.S. 86 (2010).
6. See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), rev’d sub nom.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2010).
7. Id.
8. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 93.
9. See Richter, 578 F.3d at 948
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 947–50.
13. Id. at 948.
14. Id. at 953.
15. See id.
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blood-spatter-pattern analysis and serological tests.16 The State’s blood-spatter
expert concluded (and then immediately testified, without prior notice to the
defense), from photos of the crime scene, that the blood pattern in the doorway
was inconsistent with Klein having been shot there and then later moved to the
sofa (Richter’s theory).17 The State’s serologist concluded (and then
immediately testified, also without prior defense notice) that the blood from the
doorway was inconsistent with Klein’s blood type.18 Richter’s trial attorney
did not consult any independent forensic experts, either prior to trial as part of
his preparation or during trial to evaluate the State’s last-minute expert
testimony and offered no forensic evidence to rebut the State’s expert’s
claims.19 Richter’s murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the
California Court of Appeals.20
Richter’s postconviction attorneys conducted the forensic investigation that
his trial counsel had failed to perform. In the process, they obtained
declarations from four experts. One expert, a blood-spatter-pattern expert,
reached the opposite conclusion as the State’s experts—namely, that the blood
patterns in the doorway were inconsistent with Johnson having bled while
standing there.21 Two other experts, both serologists, reached the opposite
conclusion of the State’s serologist and found that blood type analysis of the
blood taken from Johnson’s bedroom doorway could not exclude Klein as a
source.22 The final expert, a pathologist, opined that the amount of blood in the
doorway was too great to be accounted for by Johnson’s relatively minor
gunshot wounds.23 The California Supreme Court summarily denied Richter
postconviction relief in a one-sentence order.24 An en banc panel of the United
States Court of Appeals found that Richter was entitled to federal habeas relief
on the ground that his trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in
failing to discover and present the exculpatory forensic evidence discovered by
his postconviction counsel.25 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
holding that federal habeas review of Richter’s conviction was precluded by the
California Supreme Court’s prior adjudication of his ineffective-assistance-of16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 94–95 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Richter, 578 F.3d at 954.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 97.
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counsel claim on its merits because the court’s rejection of his claim was not
unreasonable.26 In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted: “If this standard
is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”27
In Cullen v. Pinholster, decided during the same term as Richter, during the
death-penalty phase of Scott Pinholster’s murder trial, the State of California
offered eight witnesses to testify about Pinholster’s lengthy history of
threatening and violent behavior.28 In response, Pinholster’s attorney called
only his mother to offer evidence in mitigation of the sought-after death
sentence.29 After hearing this evidence, the jury unanimously recommended
the death penalty, which the sentencing judge imposed.30 During state
postconviction proceedings, Pinholster’s attorneys unearthed a substantial
amount of evidence documenting his severe mental illness, including “school,
medical, and legal records,” and the diagnosis of a psychiatrist who opined that
his behavior resulted, in part, from bipolar disorder, none of which his trial
counsel had discovered (or therefore presented to his sentencing jury).31
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court twice summarily denied his claim
that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance during his
capital sentencing proceedings.32 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted Pinholster federal habeas relief on the ground that the state courts’
failure to recognize the ineffective assistance of his penalty-phase counsel
constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.33 The
Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief, holding that Pinholster was not
entitled to federal habeas corpus relief and that the district court should not have
considered any evidence (i.e., that was adduced at the federal habeas hearing)
that was not presented to the first state court that adjudicated Pinholster’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.34

26. See id. at 112–13.
27. Id. at 96.
28. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 176–77 (2010).
29. Id. Pinholster’s mother described his troubled childhood and what a lovely son he was (the
two brutal murders for which he was on trial notwithstanding). Id. at 174, 177.
30. See id. at 177.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 177–78.
33. See id. at 180 (discussing the California Supreme Court’s application of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that, in order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, a postconviction petitioner must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced the proceedings below)).
34. See id. at 180–81.
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The current iteration of the federal habeas corpus statute,35 the vehicle by
which most federal constitutional challenges to state criminal adjudication
arrive in (or are kept from) federal court, precludes federal-court review of the
constitutionality of the conduct of state trials for a host of reasons, including: a
strict statute of limitations;36 bars to review arising from the failure to exhaust
state remedies37 and the default of independent state procedural rules;38 strict
limits on when federal habeas courts may hold evidentiary hearings;39 and a
highly deferential standard of review for state court rulings.40 The result is that
a review on the merits of an inmate’s claim that a state court violated the federal
constitution in adjudicating a criminal case is the unicorn of federal jurisdiction:
lots of people dream of seeing one, but almost no one ever does.
Of course, any observer of federal jurisdiction knows that the height of the
procedural barrier to review tends to correlate with the willingness (or lack
thereof) of the court being asked to review, to do so. Richard Fallon has argued
that the Court erects high procedural barriers when it wishes to avoid a difficult
underlying substantive issue.41 Pamela Karlan has analyzed the Court’s use of
“analytic and regulatory techniques” to segregate racial-bias challenges to
criminal procedure from the rest of its equal protection jurisprudence.42
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
36. See id. § 2244(d).
37. See id. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
38. See id. § 2254(c).
39. See id. § 2254(e)(2).
40. See id. § 2254(d).
41. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 passim (1984) (discussing City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983) (holding that Lyons lacked standing to seek an injunction against
the Los Angeles Police Department chokehold policy to which he had been illegally subject because
he could not prove that he would be subjected to the chokehold procedure again in the future)); cf.
Christopher E. Smith & John Burrow, Race-ing into the Twenty-First Century: The Supreme Court
and the (E)Quality of Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 279, 288 (1997) (criticizing “the Supreme Court’s
tolerance for pretextual, race-based exclusion of African-American and other jurors”).
42. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 2001, 2002 (1998); see, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996) (holding that
the subjective motives of police officers, including intentional racial profiling, could not render a
search or seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297
(1987) (rejecting the sufficiency of the statistical evidence of racially disparate impact that McCleskey
provided in support of his challenge of racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
because it did not demonstrate intentional racial discrimination); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495–96, 502 (1974) (holding that Black citizens lacked standing to sue county officials for systematic
racial discrimination in the local criminal-justice system because they could not prove that they would
be arrested, charged, and discriminated against again in the future); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion, which held that
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During the 2015 term, the Supreme Court appeared to open the door a crack
to addressing claims of racial bias in the criminal-justice system in the context
of a claim of racially motivated jury selection that was arguably barred by
procedural default.43 Then, during the 2016 term, the Supreme Court reversed
on the merits two more cases involving challenges to apparent racial bias in the
criminal-justice system that lower courts had found, repeatedly, to be
procedurally barred.44
Are these isolated anomalies? If Fallon and Karlan are right, is the Court
signaling a willingness to tackle head on issues of racial bias in the criminaljustice system, even when doing so requires it to elide serious concerns about
the procedural posture of the state criminal cases that it is being asked to
review? And, if so, will that willingness extend to the more subtle, hidden, and
systemic implicit biases that plague the system?
Part II of this Article provides background on the Court’s traditional “race
is different” jurisprudence in criminal-procedure cases. Part III discusses
Foster v. Chapman,45 in which the Court, during the 2015 term, reversed
Foster’s conviction for capital murder after finding that the State of Georgia
had engaged in racially discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes in
composing his death-qualified jury. Part IV discusses Buck v. Stephens46 and
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,47 two cases involving criminal convictions that
the Court reversed during the 2016 term on race-discrimination grounds. Part
V notes that Foster, Buck, and Pena-Rodriguez, all involved explicit,
intentional appeals to racial bias, rather than more subtle forms of racial bias,
which courts have traditionally been loath to address on their merits. Part VI
concludes that the larger question left open by these cases is whether the Court’s
willingness to bend the procedural rules and open itself to claims of racial bias
will extend to the more nefarious, systemic, and common implicit biases, that
pervade the criminal-justice system.
II. RACE IS DIFFERENT: AN ANCIENT PEDIGREE
There is, of course, a very old pedigree for the idea that racial
discrimination, particularly against Black Americans, is different in a way that

the Fourth Amendment permitted full custodial arrests for any offense, no matter how minor, for
ignoring the relationship between the arrest power and racial profiling).
43. See infra Part III.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
46. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
47. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
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requires extraordinary remedies, most notably in the context of the right to trial
by jury, going back to cases like Strauder v. West Virginia.48 In Strauder, a
Black defendant charged with murder in state court challenged the State’s
practice of trying him by a de jure all-white jury under the Equal Protection
Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment.49 The Supreme Court held that
equal protection included a prohibition against being tried by a jury from which
people of color had been excluded.50 In reaching its holding, the Court
reasoned:
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not
excluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the
qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing make
discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to
persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe
the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.
Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its aim
was against discrimination because of race or color. As we
have said more than once, its design was to protect an
emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal
discriminations against those who belong to it.51
Having found that Strauder’s all-white state jury was unconstitutional, the
Court then went further, ordering, pursuant to a federal Reconstruction statute,
that his case be removed from state court to federal court for trial, analogizing
the federal jurisdiction at issue to federal-question jurisdiction.52
Since Strauder, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated a belief that
concerns involving racial animus outweigh the concerns like finality and
efficiency that underlie most procedural barriers. For example, in Aldridge v.
United States,53 the Court reversed Aldridge’s murder conviction for killing a
white police officer after the trial court refused to engage in in-depth voir dire
of one juror’s potentially disqualifying racial biases against Aldridge, who was
Black, reasoning: “Despite the privileges accorded to the negro, we do not think
that it can be said that the possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify
the risk in forbidding the inquiry.”54 The Court reinforced the need for inquiry

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
See id. at 304.
See id. at 310.
Id.
See id. at 312.
283 U.S. 308 (1931).
Id. at 309, 314–15.
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into the potential for race-based bias in the attitudes of potential white jurors in
the trials of Black defendants in Ham v. South Carolina—a drug prosecution
against a prominent Black civil-rights activist involving charges that Ham
asserted were racially motivated55—where the Court held that the risk of racial
bias in jury deliberations was so serious that due process required that Ham’s
attorney be given the opportunity to engage in voir dire on the issue.56
III. OCTOBER TERM 2015: RACIALLY MOTIVATED USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
The State of Georgia charged Timothy Foster with capital murder, for
which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death.57 At the end of the
first phase of jury selection during which prospective jurors were excused for
cause, there remained a pool of forty-two “qualified” prospective jurors.58 Five
of those forty-two remaining jurors were Black.59 The State had ten peremptory
strikes available to it.60 It used nine of them, four to strike the four Black jurors

55. 409 U.S. 524, 525–26 (1973).
56. See id. at 524, 526, 529.
57. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1742 (2016).
58. Id. at 1743. Jury selection in criminal cases typically takes place in two phases. First, the
parties make challenges to prospective jurors for “cause,” by alleging reasons why they cannot fairly
and impartially decide the case. See id. In the context of the death penalty, many of these challenges
for cause involve issues relating to prospective jurors’ personal beliefs about capital punishment. For
example, a juror who expresses an inability to ever vote in favor of the death penalty will usually be
stricken at this phase for cause, a process referred to as Witherspooning, because of the Supreme Court
case recognizing that strong and inflexible beliefs about the death penalty could amount to juror bias
warranting striking those jurors who held them for cause. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
520–22 (1968) (authorizing the exclusion of prospective jurors in death-penalty cases if their personal
opposition to the death penalty unequivocally compromised their ability to follow the law in
determining the accused’s guilt or punishment). Once these cause strikes (which are not limited in
number) have been litigated, the second phase of jury selection involves the parties’ exercise of their
peremptory challenges, which are strikes that the parties can make against any remaining jurors without
having to show a disqualifying bias. See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743. The parties have a set number of
these peremptory challenges, id., which they can make for any or no reason other than impermissible
discrimination. Id. at 1754–55; see Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981,
981–82 (1996).
59. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743, 1750.
60. Id. at 1743; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 15–12–165 (1985).
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in the pool, until an all-white jury remained.61 Foster objected on Batson
grounds.62
In response, the State proffered a host of facially race-neutral explanations
for striking each of the jurors.63 Collectively, however, the State’s explanations
suffered from a host of credibility defects. Many of the explanations were
subjective or vague. These explanations included the failure to make eye
contact,64 being “curt,”65 seeming nervous,66 responding to voir dire questions
too slowly,67 and equivocating in answering questions about views on the death
penalty.68 Other explanations, while facially neutral, seemed only to apply to
Black prospective jurors. For example, the State claimed to have stricken Black
jurors for being divorced,69 for being relatively young (and therefore too close
in age to Foster),70 and for living too near the crime scene,71 while failing to
strike white jurors who were also divorced,72 lived even closer to the crime
scene,73 or the juror who was the youngest in the venire at twenty-one years old
and white.74 Other explanations were flatly inconsistent with one another. For
example, the State claimed to strike one Black juror for having unsuccessfully
sought to be excused for cause during the first phase of jury selection75 and
another for not wanting to be excused.76 While either reason might be plausible
standing alone (a prospective juror trying to get out of jury service might hold
conscription against one or both of the parties; a prospective juror who wants
to serve on a jury might have an ulterior motive for service), they are
inconsistent when used together to strike half of the Black jurors in the venire.77
61. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
62. Id. at 1742–43 (referencing Batson v. Kenucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (establishing the
procedure by which a Black defendant alleging that members of his race had been impermissibly
excluded from his venire could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination)).
63. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743–45, 1748, 1750, 1754.
64. See id. at 1748.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1751.
68. See id. at 1754.
69. See id. at 1750.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1751.
72. Id. at 1750.
73. See id. at 1751.
74. See id. at 1750–51.
75. Id. at 1751.
76. Id. at 1748.
77. See id. at 1754.
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Despite the obvious credibility concerns with the State’s putative raceneutral reasons for the disparate impact of its exercise of peremptory strikes on
Black prospective jurors, the trial court rejected Foster’s Batson challenge, and
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that decision on appeal.78 While Foster’s
petition for postconviction relief was pending in the state trial court, he
acquired, through discovery, documents relating to prosecutors’ conduct of jury
selection, including the jury venire list, juror questionnaires,79 and their
personal notes from jury selection.80 All of the documents were explicitly
coded for race: the venire list had handwritten “B”s next to each Black
prospective juror’s name;81 the race of the prospective Black jurors was circled
on each of their questionnaires;82 and the handwritten notes included comments
like “No Black Church” next to Black jurors’ names.83
During the postconviction proceedings, the State offered an affidavit from
a prosecution investigator who had participated in the prosecution team’s jury
selection process.84 The affidavit entered in evidence, however, had been
redacted to remove the following sentences from the original before its
submission to the court: “If it comes down to having to pick one of the Black
jurors, [this one] might be okay. . . . [I]f we had to pick a Black juror, I
recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors.”85
The state postconviction court denied relief to Foster on two alternative
grounds: (1) that Foster’s Batson claim was not reviewable on postconviction
review, under the doctrine of res judicata, because it had already been fully and
finally litigated to his detriment on direct appeal; and (2) that Foster had offered
insufficient evidence of intentional racial discrimination.86 The latter holding
(the rejection of Foster’s postconviction Batson claim on its merits) presented
a federal question for the Supreme Court to review (whether Foster’s conviction
was obtained in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).87
The former holding (that the state common law doctrine of res judicata
78. See id. at 1743.
79. Prospective jurors are asked to fill out questionnaires answering general questions about their
life, employment, family, and community ties prior to the start of individualized jury voir dire. See
generally ABA, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, Principle 11(A)(1) (2005).
80. See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743–44.
81. Id. at 1744.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (alterations in original).
86. See id. at 1745.
87. Id. at 1742–43.
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precluded reversing Foster’s conviction on Batson grounds), on the other hand,
was arguably an independent and adequate state-law ground that would
preclude the Court’s federal question review of the merits holding.88 Rather
than punt by finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the Court found (after some
stretching) that the Georgia court’s first holding was essentially rendered dicta
when it continued on to reach the second merits holding.89 The Court then
proceeded to reverse the Georgia court’s Batson holding, finding that its
“shifting explanations,” “misrepresentations of the record,” “persistent focus
on race in the prosecution’s file,” and the fact that the State’s proffered reasons
for striking Black panelists applied equally to white panelists who were not
stricken, combined to be powerful “circumstantial evidence that ‘bear[s] upon
the issue of racial animosity’” requiring the conclusion “that the strikes of [two
Black jurors] were ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’”90
The Court’s willingness to overlook a possible jurisdictional barrier to
reaching the merits of Foster’s racial discrimination claim is all the more
noteworthy given that it has previously (and fairly recently) refused to equate
even implausible purportedly race-neutral explanations for the use of
peremptory strikes with impermissible discrimination. In 1994, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered habeas corpus relief for
Jimmy Elem after the State of Missouri, had stricken two Black prospective
jurors from his jury because the prosecutor did not like the look of their haircuts

88. See id. at 1745–46; see also, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 310, 321 (2010) (holding
that California’s time limitation on applications for habeas corpus relief was an independent and
adequate state-law ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60
(2009) (holding that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule could provide an adequate basis in state
law to bar federal habeas review of Kindler’s conviction); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 533–34
(1992) (holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address Sochor’s claim that his
sentencing court instruction to his capital sentencing jury about “heinousness” as an aggravating factor
violated the U.S. Constitution because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision affirming his death
sentence rested on the adequate and independent state-law ground that he had not preserved the claim
for appellate review); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991) (holding that the state
procedural rule requiring dismissal of Coleman’s state-court appeal, due to untimely notice of appeal,
was based on an independent state-law ground that precluded federal habeas review of his conviction);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037, 1043–44, 1053 (1983) (holding that the Supreme Court did
not lack jurisdiction to decide whether the search of the passenger compartment of Long’s vehicle
during an investigatory stop of an occupant violated the Fourth Amendment, even though the Michigan
Supreme Court had found that the search violated both the federal and state constitution, because the
Michigan court’s state constitutional decision was not an adequate and independent state-law ground
on which to sustain its decision in the absence of the federal constitutional determination).
89. See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1745–47.
90. Id. at 1754 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 485 (2008)).
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and facial hair.91 The Eighth Circuit presumed that the State’s proffered raceneutral reasons had to be pretextual, since there was no obvious relationship
between hairstyles and qualifications and the State had not offered any
additional information.92 The Supreme Court summarily reversed the grant of
habeas relief, without argument and over a strenuous dissent, rejecting the
Eighth Circuit’s assumption that “silly” and “implausible or fantastic”
explanations could not be facially race neutral, even when together they led to
a racially disparate pattern of strikes.93
Similarly, in Wilkerson v. Texas,94 the Court denied certiorari of the
question as to whether jurors could be examined and excluded on the basis of
their negative, potentially racist perceptions of defense counsel.95 In Thaler v.
Haynes,96 the Court, in a per curiam order, summarily rejected a Batson
challenge to a trial court’s failure to inquire further after a prosecutor offered,
by way of a race-neutral reason, that he excluded a prospective Black juror
because of the juror’s “demeanor” rather than race.97 In Felker v. Jackson,98
the Court, in another per curiam order, summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
grant of federal habeas relief on Batson grounds because the court failed
adequately to defer to the factual findings of the state courts below.99
IV. OCTOBER TERM 2016: CLAIMS OF RACIAL BIAS IN CRIMINAL
ADJUDICATION
It was possible that Foster was simply an anomaly or was motivated by
federal-jurisdiction principles rather than a desire to talk about race and the
criminal-justice system, but the Court, during the 2016 term, unearthed two
more analogous cases involving racial animus out from underneath what
seemed to be high procedural hurdles and, in doing so, echoed themes from
Foster.100

91. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766–67 (1995).
92. See id. at 767.
93. Id. at 768, 770.
94. 493 U.S. 924 (1989) (Mem.)
95. Id. at 924 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 559 U.S. 43 (2010) (per curiam).
97. See id. at 48–49.
98. 562 U.S. 594 (2011) (per curiam).
99. See id. at 597–98.
100. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
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A. Racial Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty
The State of Texas convicted Duane Buck of the capital murder of his exgirlfriend and her male friend.101 Buck’s guilt was not at issue, but whether he
should be executed for his crime was.102 During the penalty phase, the primary
aggravating factor at issue was Buck’s future dangerousness.103 In determining
future dangerousness, psychiatric experts utilize multi-factored statistical
models to predict a defendant’s risk based, primarily, on the aggregate impact
of categorical, actuarial factors like age, race, marital status, criminal history,
certain personality traits, etc.104 During Buck’s court-appointed defense
attorney’s direct examination of his psychiatric expert, Dr. Walter Quijano, the
attorney elicited answers from him about the individual components of his risk
model, including the race factor.105 In response, Quijano opined: “It’s a sad
commentary that minorities, Hispanics and Black people, are over represented
in the Criminal Justice System.”106 The prosecutor followed up on the defense
attorney’s line of inquiry on cross-examination, asking Quijano to make explicit
the implicit import of his direct examination testimony—namely, that Buck was
more likely to pose a danger, because he was Black, than a similarly situated
white man, asking: “[T]he race factor, [B]lack, increases the future
dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?”107 Without
objection from the defense attorney, Quijano responded, “Yes.”108 The court,
on the jury’s recommendation, ultimately sentenced Buck to death.109
The postconviction procedural history in Buck is multilayered and
complicated, but what follows is as brief a summary as possible of its relevant
components. In 1997, Buck filed his first state petition seeking habeas relief
from his death sentence.110 In it, his state habeas counsel failed to challenge the

101. Buck v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 668, 669 (5th Cir. 2015).
102. See id. at 669–71.
103. Id. at 669–70. The State alleged that the likelihood of Buck’s future commission of criminal
acts was high enough that he would pose a continuing threat to society if he was not put to death, a
special question requiring an affirmative answer for his death eligibility. See id. at 669. See generally
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1) (2013) (establishing the future-dangerousness
factor).
104. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J.
275, 283–85 (2006).
105. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 669.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 670.
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admission of the race-based dangerousness testimony at his sentencing
proceeding on any ground.111
In 2000, in an unrelated case, the Texas Attorney General confessed error,
before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in permitting sentencing-phase
experts to testify in death-penalty cases that race increased certain defendants’
likelihood of future dangerousness.112 In doing so, the State identified several
other cases in which it had elicited similar testimony, including Buck, and
notified the respective defense attorneys in those cases.113
In 2002, Buck filed a second state habeas corpus petition alleging the
constitutionally ineffective assistance of his sentencing counsel for his role in
eliciting and failing to object to the race-based dangerousness testimony.114 At
the request of the State (despite its apparent pledge not to do so), the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Buck’s successive petition as an abuse of
the writ.115
In 2004, Buck filed a federal petition for habeas corpus relief on the ground
that his sentencing counsel’s ineffective assistance violated the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.116 The district court denied relief
on the ground that Buck had procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance
claim by failing to raise it in his first state habeas petition, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial.117
In 2013, Buck filed a third state habeas petition.118 While that petition was
pending in the Texas state courts, the United States Supreme Court decided
Trevino v. Thaler,119 which found Texas’s provision of state habeas counsel to
be so inadequate that the failure of state habeas counsel to raise issues would

111. See id.
112. See id. Quijano was apparently a regular expert for the State in capital sentencing
proceedings, and so the State frequently elicited testimony from him on direct examination that was
similar to what was elicited on cross-examination in Buck. See id.
113. See id. The record below is inconclusive regarding the exact chronology of events
surrounding the State’s confession of error with regard to Buck’s case because Buck never had a
hearing on the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, but there is some evidence to
suggest that the State of Texas, at this period of time, also agreed not to raise procedural bars to relief
for the affected defendants. See id. at 670 n.1.
114. Id. at 670.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 671.
119. 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013).
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not bar federal relief under Martinez v. Ryan.120 Despite Trevino, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, in a narrowly decided 4–3 decision, again dismissed
Buck’s third petition as an abuse of the writ.121
In 2014, Buck filed a motion for relief from judgment in federal district
court, on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, under Rule 60(b).122
Rule 60(b) permits a plaintiff to challenge a previous ruling that precluded a
determination of a federal question on the merits, but does not permit a plaintiff
to challenge a prior merits-based ruling.123 The district court denied Buck’s
motion on the ground that there were no extraordinary circumstances justifying
relief from judgment.124 The court also denied Buck a certificate of
appealability (COA) to the Fifth Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that
denial, concluding that the case was “not an extraordinary circumstance in the
habeas context.”125
Buck filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asking review of
the Fifth Circuit’s denial of his COA.126 After more than a decade of
postconviction petitions and motions to both state and federal courts, Buck has
never had a hearing on the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim.127 The question on which the Court granted certiorari review was,
therefore, rather tortured:
[D]id the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of
Appealability (COA) standard . . . when it denied Mr. Buck a
COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits
review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified
that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future
120. See id. at 1921 (citing 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012) (holding that ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel could establish cause to excuse the failure of a federal habeas petitioner to
exhaust a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in state postconviction proceedings)).
121. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 671.
122. Id. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (authorizing relief from a final judgment that is void
or otherwise unjust). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, govern federal habeas corpus proceedings because habeas corpus functions as a collateral
challenge to a state criminal conviction by way of a civil suit against the custodian of the inmate
challenging the constitutionality of the state adjudication as a basis for confinement. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 note (2012) (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, Rule 12,
Advisory Committee Note).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
124. See Buck, 623 F. App’x at 671.
125. Id. at 671, 673–74.
126. Brief for Petitioner at i, Buck, 623 F. App’x 668 (No. 15-8049).
127. Id. at 1.
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because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a
prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at
sentencing?128
While the procedural posture of Buck meant that the Court was being asked
to review the strictness of the standard under which the Fifth Circuit determines
whether to grant COAs, the oral arguments focused primarily on the underlying
merits of Buck’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim: the significant and
pervasive effect that the impact of Buck’s race being a dangerousness factor
may have had on his sentencing jury.129 Chief Justice Roberts questioned the
Texas Solicitor General at length about the possibility that the jury may have
condemned Buck to death because it “had this evidence that he was, by virtue
of his race, likely to be dangerous.”130
The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s denial of the COA.131 While the
narrow question presented to the Court, again, involved the COA standard, the
Court nonetheless decided to address “the underlying merits” to Buck’s claim,
reasoning, extraordinarily, that, because the parties had briefed the issues, it
was “proper to meet the decision below and the arguments of the parties on
their own terms.”132 On the issue of Buck’s ineffective-assistance claim, the
Court found Buck’s sentencing counsel to have engaged in deficient
performance, explaining:
Given that the jury had to make a finding of future
dangerousness before it could impose a death sentence, Dr.
Quijano’s report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin
made him more deserving of execution. It would be patently
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to
be a future danger because of his race.133
The Court also found that Buck’s counsel’s deficient performance—two
fleeting references to the relationship between race and dangerousness—was so
prejudicial that, without it, there was a reasonable probability that the jury
would not have sentenced him to death, “notwithstanding the nature of Buck’s
crime and his behavior in its aftermath.”134 Rejecting the State’s suggestion
that the impact of these brief, cryptic references to race was de minimis, the
Court concluded:
[A]ccording to Dr. Quijano, that immutable characteristic
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at i.
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Buck, 623 F. App’x 668 (No. 15-8049).
Id. at 30.
See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017).
Id. at 775.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 776.
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carried with it an “[i]ncreased probability” of future violence.
Here was hard statistical evidence—from an expert—to guide
an otherwise speculative inquiry.
And it was potent evidence. Dr. Quijano’s testimony
appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of [B]lack men
as “violence prone.” In combination with the substance of the
jury’s inquiry, this created something of a perfect storm. Dr.
Quijano’s opinion coincided precisely with a particularly
noxious strain of racial prejudice, which itself coincided
precisely with the central question at sentencing. The effect of
this unusual confluence of factors was to provide support for
making a decision on life or death on the basis of race.
....
. . . [W]hen a jury hears expert testimony that expressly
makes a defendant’s race directly pertinent on the question
of life or death, the impact of that evidence cannot be
measured simply by how much air time it received at trial
or how many pages it occupies in the record. Some toxins
can be deadly in small doses.135
The Court then addressed the procedural hurdle to Buck’s success on these
merits: whether Buck could use a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen a case so
extensively and conclusively litigated.136 The Court concluded that Buck
presented “extraordinary circumstances” justifying extraordinary relief and that
the district court had abused its discretion in deciding otherwise.137 The Court
explained:
Buck may have been sentenced to death in part because of his
race. As an initial matter, this is a disturbing departure from a
basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our law punishes
people for what they do, not who they are. Dispensing
punishment on the basis of an immutable characteristic flatly
contravenes this guiding principle. . . .
This departure from basic principle was exacerbated
because it concerned race. “Discrimination on the basis of
race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.” 138
The Court dismissed the invited-error aspect of Buck’s case—namely, that it
had been defense counsel, rather than the prosecutor, that had elicited the
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 776–77 (citations omitted).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 778 (citation omitted).
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racially discriminatory testimony: “Regardless of which party first broached the
subject, race was . . . put to the jury ‘as a factor . . . to weigh in making its
determination.’”139
Finally, the Court refused to entertain the State’s argument that Buck was
not entitled to retroactive application of Martinez and Trevino at such a late
stage in the proceedings, not because the argument lacked merit, but because:
“If we were to entertain the State’s eleventh-hour [retroactivity] argument and
find it persuasive, Buck’s Strickland and Rule 60(b)(6) contentions—the issues
we thought worthy of review—would be insulated from our consideration.”140
The Court, therefore, declined to reach the retroactivity question and concluded
that Martinez and Trevino applied retroactively only to Buck’s claim, while
reserving the right to find them not to be retroactive as applied to any other
habeas petitioners in the future.141
B. Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations
The State of Colorado charged Miguel Pena-Rodriguez, who is Chicano,
with harassing and assaulting two teenage girls in a women’s room at the
racetrack where he worked.142 In his defense, he offered alibi testimony from
a friend and coworker, who is also Chicano, that they were working together at
the time of the alleged attack.143 After the jury found Pena-Rodriguez guilty of
some of the charges, jurors came forward to report that, during deliberation,
one juror, who self-identified as a former law-enforcement officer, had claimed,
relying on previous investigative experience, that “I think he did it because he’s
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”144
Unfortunately for Pena-Rodriguez, however, Colorado, like most
jurisdictions, has a jury verdict non-impeachment rule, which states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith.145
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 779 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 780.
Id.
Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015).
Id. at 288 & n.3.
See id. at 288–89.
COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
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The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Pena-Rodriguez’s conviction on the
ground that the “plain language” of Rule 606(b) precluded it from considering
the evidence of the juror’s comments during deliberations, rejecting his claim
that Rule 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.146
The United States Supreme Court has had two fairly recent occasions to
visit the constitutionality of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which is
substantially similar to Colorado’s rule, and upheld it both times despite
troubling facts. The first case was Tanner v. United States.147 Tanner’s jury
apparently mistook his federal criminal trial for a booze cruise, drinking to
excess, and even smoking marijuana and snorting cocaine while on breaks.148
Some jurors were so inebriated that they passed out at one point during the
trial.149 When Tanner sought to overturn his guilty verdict on jury-misconduct
grounds, the lower federal courts refused to consider affidavits from concerned
jurors describing the drug and alcohol consumption of their peers, based on
Rule 606(b).150 The Supreme Court affirmed the denial on the basis of the
importance of the “policy considerations” that underlay jury secrecy, namely
the need for the “full and frank discussion in the jury room” of difficult and
controversial issues.151 The Court also expressed concern about whether any
jury deliberation would live up to searching scrutiny, commenting: “It is not at
all clear . . . that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”152
The second case was Warger v. Shauers,153 which upheld the
constitutionality of Rule 606(b) to bar evidence that a juror had lied during voir
dire, a scenario that a majority of federal circuits had previously held to
constitute strong evidence of jury bias (theorizing that the only reason that a
juror would lie about a disqualifying bias during voir dire was to get on a jury
knowing that he or she could not decide the case impartially).154 Warger,
however, expressly reserved decision, in a footnote, about whether there could
be “cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right
has been abridged.”155 The question presented in Pena-Rodriguez’s petition for
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 289, 291–93.
483 U.S. 107 (1987).
Id. at 115–16.
See id. at 116.
See id. at 113.
Id. at 119–21.
Id. at 120.
135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
See id. at 525, 529.
See id. at 529 n.3.
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certiorari was precisely “whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may
bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury.”156
The Supreme Court also denied another petition for certiorari in the 2016
term in a case involving juror bias of a non-racial variety.157 In that case, “[a]
jury convicted Jose Felipe Velasco of committing a lewd and lascivious act
against a child.”158 Velasco argued that his right to a fair trial with an impartial
jury was violated when the trial court failed to discharge for bias a juror who
failed, until after opening statements, to disclose her knowledge of an analogous
incident at her daughter’s school.159 His challenge was rejected by the
California Court of Appeals,160 and that rejection was upheld by the United
States District Court for the Central District of California and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on federal habeas review on the ground
that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law and was not an unreasonable
determination of the facts.161
The oral arguments before the Court in Pena-Rodriguez focused almost
entirely over whether and to what extent race was “different” in a way that
warranted an exception to the ordinary rules of verdict non-impeachment.162
Justice Sotomayor expressed her belief that “the most pernicious and odious
discrimination in our law is based on race,” and advocated finding nonimpeachment rules unconstitutional as applied only to issues of race.163 Justice
Breyer noted that “race is a special problem” when it comes to the issue of the
systemic fairness of criminal justice.164 Justice Kagan asserted the possibility
that “the interests in preventing unfairness of this kind are much
156. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)
(No. 15-606).
157. See Velasco v. Sherman, 137 S. Ct. 379 (2016) (Mem.), denying cert. sub nom. to Velasco
v. Allison, 645 Fed. App’x. 598 (9th Cir. 2016), aff’g 2014 WL 1266978 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014),
denying petition to 2013 WL 8150866 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2013), denying petition sub nom. to People
v. Velasco, No. G042281, 2011 WL 264695 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011).
158. Velasco, 2011 WL 264695, at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *6.
161. See Velasco v. Allison, No. CV 12-1011-JSL (AGR), 2013 WL 8150866 *14 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 27, 2013); Velasco, 2014 WL 1266978; Velasco, 645 F. App’x at 598.
162. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)
(No. 15-606). See generally Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979) (“Discrimination on the basis
of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”).
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606).
164. Id. at 20.

LEONETTI - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

226

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/17 2:47 PM

[101:205

greater; . . . verdicts based on race discrimination pose a [fundamentally
different] harm tha[n] verdicts based on other kinds of unfairnesses,” and
further argued that “it seems artificial not to think about the Sixth Amendment
[right to a fair and impartial jury] as [being] informed by the principles of the
Equal Protection Clause.”165 She also noted the special nature of race in the
criminal-justice system, explaining: “[T]here’s a special kind of harm . . . in
punishing people because of their race. And maybe especially because race is
so associated with particular stereotypes respecting criminality, . . . it’s also the
worst thing that you can suggest about the criminal justice system, that it allows
that to happen.”166
In its opinion in Pena-Rodriguez, the Court found that Rule 606(b) violated
Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury as applied
to the situation involving the juror’s explicitly racist comments, holding that
the Sixth Amendment required a reviewing court to admit and consider the
evidence of racial animus from deliberations.167 In reaching its decision, the
Court emphasized the “distinct” role of racism in the criminal trial process,
requiring “added precaution,” noting what it termed the “imperative to purge
racial prejudice from the administration of justice” because “racial
discrimination in the jury system posed a particular threat both to the promise
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial.”168 The
Court found that “the Tanner safeguards may be less effective in rooting out
racial bias than other kinds of bias.”169 The Court concluded: “The
unmistakable principle underlying [the Court’s] precedents [prohibiting statesponsored racial discrimination in the jury system] is that discrimination on the
basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.’”170 The Court described “racial bias” as “a familiar
and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury” and that
it “implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”171

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30–31.
See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
Id. at 867–69.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 868 (citation omitted).
Id.
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V. SMOKING GUNS & DOG WHISTLES
That the Court simply removed otherwise insurmountable procedural
barriers in these cases is clear. Justice Breyer’s comments during the oral
arguments in Buck are particularly illustrative:
We do know that the prosecutor asked the expert witness, is it correct
that the race factor, [B]lack, increases the future dangerousness for
various complicated reasons. And he says, yes.
....
. . . [T]he issue here is, is there some good reason why this
person shouldn’t have been able to reopen his case? I mean,
that’s the question. What’s the reason?172
Chief Justice Roberts chimed in and asked the Texas Solicitor General,
“[W]ouldn’t it seem pretty straightforward to say, okay, maybe he’s right,
maybe he’s wrong, but at least he’s made a substantial showing. Let’s give him
a Certificate of Appealability, and then we’ll go through the normal procedures
on the merits?”173
Dissenting in Buck, Justice Thomas complained: “Having settled on a
desired outcome, the Court bulldoze[d] procedural obstacles and misapplie[d]
settled law to justify it.”174 He went on to note:
[A]fter chastising the Court of Appeals for making an end run
around the COA standard in order to reach the merits of
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) claim, the Court d[id] precisely that.
Astonishingly, the Court also decide[d] the merits of
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim—an issue that was not
even ‘addressed by the Fifth Circuit.’
This unapologetic course reversal—made without so much
as a hint of the irony—is striking.175
He concluded that “[p]ermitting a defendant to file a Rule 60(b) motion years
after the fact functionally eviscerates the statute of limitations [for federal

172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049).
Justice Breyer’s argument that the Court ought not to let procedural barriers interfere with Buck having
one full hearing on the merits of his claim is particularly striking when compared with his comments
at oral arguments during Richter. When Richter’s attorney argued that Richter had not had an
adjudication of the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim at the California Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer responded, rather blithely: “But if, in this case, [the California Supreme Court]
did reject it on a procedural ground, and it was a reasonable ground that they applied consistently, then
the Ninth Circuit or the Federal courts couldn’t consider the claim at all; is that right?” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 14, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2010) (No. 09-587).
173. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–36, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).
174. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 780–81 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
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habeas review of state convictions].”176 Justice Alito similarly complained,
dissenting in Pena-Rodriguez, that “the majority barely bother[ed] to engage
with the policy issues implicated by no-impeachment rules.”177
One thing that unites these three cases—Foster, Buck, and PenaRodriguez—is that they do not involve subtle or debatable issues of implicit
bias or dog-whistle racism. They involve explicit, intentional appeals to racial
bias—as close to a smoking gun as one is ever likely to see in a contested racialequality challenge in the twenty-first century. Justice Alito described the racebased dangerousness testimony in Buck as “indefensible”178 and the juror’s
remarks in Pena-Rodriguez as “very blatant.”179 Justice Thomas described the
testimony in Buck as “expressly racial.”180 Justice Kagan described the remarks
in Pena-Rodriguez as “a screaming race bias in the jury room . . . the best
smoking gun evidence you’re ever going to see about race bias in the jury
room.”181 The majority in Pena-Rodgriguez expressly limited its decision to
“overt racial bias” and described the juror comments at issue as “egregious and
unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias.”182
Courts have generally refused to take on “subtler” forms of racial
discrimination. For example, in People v. Taylor, Taylor was a Black man
charged with capital murder for raping and murdering an elderly white
woman.183 Prior to jury selection, the trial court gave prospective jurors a
questionnaire that included four questions meant to elicit information about
their racial attitudes.184 When the written responses of several jurors included
ambiguous or inconsistent answers about their racial attitudes, the trial court
refused Taylor’s request to ask follow-up questions to clarify the responses.185
For example, two jurors answered both that they had no racial prejudices and
that they could not be fair and impartial jurors in a case in which a Black
defendant was accused of committing crimes against a white woman.186
176. Id. at 785. Justice Thomas made a similar observation dissenting in Pena-Rodriguez,
complaining that the majority had “impose[d] a uniform national rule” in an “attempt to stimulate a
‘thoughtful, rational dialogue’ on race relations.” Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
177. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting).
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606).
180. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 785 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855 (No. 15-606).
182. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869–70.
183. See 229 P.3d 12, 29 (Cal. 2010).
184. Id. at 43.
185. See id. at 44.
186. Id.
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Another juror characterized her racial prejudices as “mild” because she was
“fearful around large numbers of [B]lacks, Hispanics—or even [W]hites—if it
[was] an unsafe area.”187 Nonetheless, the trial court conducted no additional
inquiry, and the jurors were ultimately seated for Taylor’s trial.188 On appeal,
the California Supreme Court rejected Taylor’s claim that the trial court’s
questioning regarding potential racial bias was inadequate because “the juror
questionnaire gave the prospective jurors a clear opportunity to disclose views
about racial bias that would warrant their excusal from the jury” and the voir
dire, “when viewed as a whole, was not so inadequate as to render his trial
fundamentally unfair.”189
In State v. Tucker, Tucker, a Black man, was convicted of the brutal beating
and rape of a white woman.190 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court
rejected Tucker’s claim that the trial court had inappropriately denied several
of his challenges of prospective jurors for cause, including two jurors who
admitted that they were philosophically opposed to interracial marriage, one of
whom said that she “just wouldn’t want [her] daughter to marry one” and that
she had been uncomfortable when she previously lived in what she described
as a “[B]lack neighborhood.”191 After admonishing that “[t]here are some
questions regarding racial attitudes the responses to which may raise red flags
that should heighten the attention of the court,” the court nonetheless held that
the trial court’s failure to strike the jurors had not constituted an abuse of
discretion.192
In Commonwealth v. McCowen, McCowen, who was Black, was convicted
of a brutal rape and murder.193 Approximately a month after his conviction,
McCowen moved for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors based on information
that the jury’s deliberations had been infected by three separate incidents
involving racial prejudice.194 In the first incident, a juror said that she was
frightened of McCowen because he was “big” and “[B]lack” and had been
trying to “intimidate” her by staring at her during the trial.195 In the second
incident, a different juror opined that bruises like those found on the victim’s

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 45.
Id. (citation omitted).
See State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1069–70 (Conn. 1993).
Id. at 1069, 1073, 1075–77.
Id. at 1078, 1080.
939 N.E.2d 735, 742 (Mass. 2010)
Id. at 761.
Id.
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body would result “when a big [B]lack guy beats up on a small woman.”196 In
the third incident, a third juror stated that he did not like Black people because
of “what they are capable of.”197 The trial court denied McCowen’s motion for
a new trial, reasoning that none of the jurors’ actions constituted racial bias.198
With regard to the first juror, the trial court found that there was no evidence
that her fear of McCowen was “tied . . . to [his] race.”199 With regard to the
second juror, the court found that her comment constituted neither “overt
prejudice” nor “veiled or subconscious bias or stereotyping,” but rather that it
“was descriptive in nature and intent” and that any racial stereotype that it
invoked was “inherent in the facts of the case.”200 With regard to the third juror,
the trial court found that his comment was not an expression of “racial
animus.”201 On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that
the trial court had neither erred in its finding of facts nor in its legal conclusion
that a new trial for McCowen was warranted, contrasting the jurors comments
in McCowen with a juror comment in another case that “the goddamned spic is
guilty just sitting there; look at him. Why bother having the trial.”202
VI. CONCLUSION
The deeper question that remains, therefore, is whether the Supreme
Court’s recent willingness to bend the procedural rules and open itself to claims
of racial bias, if that is what the Court is exhibiting, will extend to the more
nefarious, systemic, and common implicit biases that pervade the system.203 As
Justice Marshall pointed out, dissenting from the Court’s denial of certiorari in
Wilkerson: “If such ‘smoking guns’ are ignored, we have little hope of
combating the more subtle forms of racial discrimination.”204 What about
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 763.
199. Id. at 762.
200. Id. at 762–63.
201. Id. at 762.
202. Id. at 765–66.
203. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 (2010) (“Implicit biases are the plethora of fears, feelings,
perceptions, and stereotypes that lie deep within our subconscious, without our conscious permission
or acknowledgement.”); see also Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury:
A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 961–62 (1982) (“[Implied bias] is
based on the recognition that certain relationships between a litigant and a prospective juror are likely
to result, consciously or unconsciously, in the bias of the juror.”).
204. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Mem.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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credibility determinations that are infused with stereotype-congruent responses
to witnesses or parties of color—e.g., a jury’s determination of whether a
defendant acted in self-defense, a judge’s determination of the legally
permissible amount of force in apprehending a putatively “dangerous” suspect
of color, or a lawyer’s use of subconscious stereotypes during the exercise of
peremptory challenges?205 How should courts deal with well-documented
implicit biases in the criminal-justice system like racially biased
“misremembering” and the “shooter bias”?206
Justice Alito reformulated this Article’s question about whether the
Court is prepared to take on these subtler, more implicit forms of racism into a
slippery-slope argument in his dissenting opinion in Pena-Rodriguez:
Attempting to limit the damage worked by its decision, the
Court says that only “clear” expressions of bias must be
admitted, but judging whether a statement is sufficiently
“clear” will often not be easy. Suppose that the allegedly
biased juror in this case never made reference to PeñaRodriguez’s race or national origin but said that he had a lot of
experience with “this macho type” and knew that men of this
kind felt that they could get their way with women. Suppose
that other jurors testified that they were certain that “this
macho type” was meant to refer to Mexican or Hispanic
men.207
Of course, this author hopes that the Court will go down that slippery slope,
but the extent of the Court’s willingness to address these bigger—and more
prevalent—issues of implicit, dog-whistle biases, remains to be seen.

205. See Montoya, supra note 58, at 1024 (“Batson also fails to recognize that much
discrimination in jury selection, like discrimination generally, is the product of unconscious racism and
sexism.”).
206. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 357 (2007) (“The ‘shooter bias’ refers to participants’ propensity
to shoot Black perpetrators more quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide
not to shoot White bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders.”).
207. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

